FINRA fines Webull $4.2m over AML, customer ID and best execution
Reviewed by NV Global editorial team

Webull approved more than 120,000 accounts without a reasonable belief it knew who the customers were, FINRA found. The broker settled for $4.2 million.
FINRA announced on 5 November 2026 that it had censured Webull Financial LLC and fined the broker $4.2 million. FINRA found that the broker’s anti-money laundering program, including how it verified customers’ identities, and its identity theft prevention program were not reasonably designed.
What happened
FINRA, a self-regulatory organization overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), says it is not part of the government. The settlement is a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver, and Consent (AWC). In it, Webull accepts FINRA’s findings “without admitting or denying them”.
According to the AWC, Webull’s anti-money laundering program, including its customer identification program, was not reasonably designed from January 2020 to September 2023. The AWC finds the same for its identity theft prevention program from January 2020 to February 2023, violating Rule 201 of Regulation S-ID. It also covers best execution failures from at least February 2020 to at least October 2025.
The sanctions are a $4,200,000 fine, a censure and corrective action. The AWC does not divide the fine between the violations.
Webull approved at least seven million new accounts from January 2020 to September 2023, the AWC states. At least 6.5 million went through a third-party vendor’s identity verification services. FINRA found that the firm approved more than 120,000 accounts “without forming a reasonable belief that it knew the true identity of its customers”. According to the AWC, more than 50 customers who uploaded landscape photos in place of a government-issued ID were approved automatically. The AWC also describes approvals of applicants whom the firm’s own systems indicated were deceased.
On identity theft, the AWC says Webull had no relevant procedures identifying red flags before November 2022. According to the AWC, roughly 80 accounts opened for foreign nationals shared two device IDs between them. Another 91 foreign-national accounts shared one IP address. Until August 2021, the AWC states, the firm had no process for spotting unrelated accounts opened with the same Social Security number.
Neither the AWC nor FINRA’s release includes a statement from Webull. Under the AWC, the firm may not publicly deny any of the findings.
Why it matters
The findings are against the broker, including for checks its vendor carried out. According to the AWC, Webull approved certain accounts that its vendor could not reasonably verify, because of inconsistencies or signs of possible identity fraud. FINRA also found that the firm lacked reasonable procedures to supervise the vendor’s verification of photo identification.
The two findings are linked. Instead of a reasonably designed identity theft program, the AWC says, Webull relied on its customer identification program and on reports from its clearing firm. FINRA found that the customer identification program was not reasonably designed either.
Under the AWC, a registered principal from senior management is to certify remediation in writing within 180 days of notice of the AWC’s acceptance. The certification covers remediation reasonably designed to address the AML and identity theft issues. Webull also undertook to retain an independent consultant within 60 days to review its best execution compliance.
Who it affects
- US broker-dealers that are FINRA members and open accounts through apps or websites
- Firms that rely on a third-party vendor to verify customer identities at account opening
- Compliance teams responsible for customer identification and for identity theft programs under Regulation S-ID
What businesses should do
- A vendor’s inability to verify a customer did not stop every approval at Webull, according to the AWC. The issue it describes is what the firm did after such a result, not its use of a vendor.
- The AWC records that the firm lacked reasonable procedures to supervise its vendor’s review of photo identification. Reasonable procedures to supervise those checks are the control it describes as missing.
- In many instances, according to the AWC, manual reviewers carried a monthly volume that FINRA found unreasonable. They also lacked reasonable documented guidance, which the findings list as a separate gap.
- The AWC names several red flags it says were missed. Among them are unrelated applicants sharing a phone number or email address, shared device IDs and IP addresses, and repeated Social Security numbers.
Sources
- FINRA, Letter of Acceptance, Waiver, and Consent No. 2021073404901, Webull Financial LLC, accessed 6 November 2026 — https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2026-11/Webull-Financial-LLC-AWC-110426.pdf
- FINRA, “FINRA Fines Webull $4.2 Million for Anti-Money Laundering and Best Execution Violations”, 5 November 2026 — https://www.finra.org/media-center/newsreleases/2026/finra-fines-webull-42-million-anti-money-laundering-and-best
- FINRA, “About FINRA”, accessed 6 November 2026 — https://www.finra.org/about
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