What is transaction monitoring in AML?

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Transaction monitoring in AML checks that customer activity fits what an institution knows. FATF expectations, red flags, Philippine CTR and STR rules.

Transaction monitoring is the part of anti-money laundering (AML) work that continues after onboarding: a bank or other regulated institution keeps checking whether a customer’s transactions fit what it knows about that customer. When activity looks unusual, the institution examines it and, if it becomes suspicious, reports it.

This guide covers the standard of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and, as the single national example, the Philippines. A rule quoted for the Philippines applies only there.

Transaction monitoring definition

Transaction monitoring is the ongoing review of a customer’s transactions to check that they fit what the institution knows about the customer and their risk profile, and to detect unusual or suspicious activity that may need reporting. The wording is ours, built on the FATF text below.

The FATF Recommendations, updated June 2026, do not use the label “transaction monitoring.” Recommendation 10 describes the activity as one of the customer due diligence (CDD) measures. Measure (d) reads: “Conducting ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds.”

In industry usage, the activity is also called Know Your Transaction (KYT). None of the FATF or Philippine legal texts cited in this article uses that term.

Transaction monitoring vs KYC

Recommendation 10 lists four CDD measures. The first three are identifying and verifying the customer, identifying the beneficial owner, and understanding the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship. Done at onboarding, they form what is often called Know Your Customer (KYC), explained in our guide to KYC verification.

The fourth measure, (d), is the ongoing due diligence and transaction scrutiny commonly called transaction monitoring. It runs for as long as the relationship lasts, and both parts belong to CDD.

What the FATF standards expect

The FATF Recommendations are addressed to countries: financial institutions “should be required” to act, and the binding duty comes from national law.

Ongoing due diligence and a risk-based approach

Under Recommendation 10, financial institutions should be required to apply each of the CDD measures (a) to (d), “but should determine the extent of such measures using a risk-based approach (RBA).” Institutions should also apply Recommendation 10 to existing customers “on the basis of materiality and risk.”

For lower risks, the Interpretive Note to Recommendation 10 (INR.10) allows, in paragraph 21, simplified measures such as reducing ongoing monitoring “based on a reasonable monetary threshold.” Such measures “are not acceptable whenever there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, or where specific higher-risk scenarios apply.”

Unusual transactions and higher-risk customers

Paragraph 20 of INR.10 says financial institutions “should examine, as far as reasonably possible, the background and purpose of all complex, unusual large transactions, and all unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic or lawful purpose.”

Where the risks of money laundering or terrorist financing are higher, financial institutions “should be required to conduct enhanced CDD measures, consistent with the risks identified.” One listed example of enhanced monitoring is “increasing the number and timing of controls applied, and selecting patterns of transactions that need further examination.” For foreign politically exposed persons (PEPs), Recommendation 12 lists enhanced ongoing monitoring among the measures financial institutions should be required to take.

Reporting suspicions and keeping records

Recommendation 20 says that if a financial institution “suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it should be required, by law, to report promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligence unit (FIU).” The FATF sets no number of days for “promptly.” Its Interpretive Note adds that “all suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, should be reported regardless of the amount of the transaction,” and that the duty should be “a direct mandatory obligation.”

Recommendation 21 adds a ban on tipping-off. Financial institutions and their directors, officers, and employees should be prohibited by law from disclosing “the fact that a suspicious transaction report (STR) or related information is being filed with the FIU.” It adds: “These provisions are not intended to inhibit information sharing under Recommendation 18,” which covers group-wide programs of financial groups.

Under Recommendation 11, financial institutions should be required to keep transaction records for at least five years, sufficient to reconstruct individual transactions. They should also be required to keep CDD records and “the results of any analysis undertaken” for at least five years after the relationship ends or after the occasional transaction.

The Recommendations place no duty on financial institutions to report transactions above a fixed amount. The Interpretive Note to Recommendation 29 says only that countries “should consider the feasibility and utility” of such a system.

How transaction monitoring works

The texts set the duties; the working order below is practice.

  1. Set the expected activity. The purpose and intended nature of the relationship, understood at onboarding (Recommendation 10(c)), is the baseline.
  2. Detect. Rules, scenarios, and customer profiling flag transactions that depart from the baseline or match a red flag.
  3. Review the alert. An analyst examines the background and purpose of the flagged activity against the customer file.
  4. Decide and document. In the Philippines, a cash (generally also equivalent-instrument) transaction over the threshold leads to a covered transaction report, and established suspicion, at any amount, to a suspicious transaction report. A transaction that is both follows the order set out below. Otherwise, the reason for closing the alert is recorded.
  5. Update the customer’s risk. A finding can raise the risk rating, which brings enhanced due diligence (EDD) and closer monitoring.

In practice, detection is rule-based, testing transactions against set scenarios, behavior-based, flagging departures from the customer’s usual profile, or both. The Philippine implementing rules discussed below require the electronic systems of covered persons that supervisors consider complex to perform “statistical analysis, profiling” and to “detect unusual patterns of account activity” (Rule 22, Section 5.2.2(a)). Practice also separates post-event review of completed transactions from screening before a payment is executed. The FATF Recommendations mention “real-time monitoring where feasible” once, for spotting cross-border payments that lack required originator or beneficiary information (INR.16, paragraph 28), without making it a general requirement.

Transaction monitoring in the Philippines

The Philippine rules bind “covered persons,” such as banks, e-money issuers, remittance companies, casinos, and real estate developers and brokers. The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) issued the 2018 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9160, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended. They are cited here in the January 2021 amendment, effective 31 January 2021. For casinos, IRR Rule 4 gives the governing role to separate casino implementing rules, which this article does not cover. The IRR provisions below are cited for the other covered persons.

The AMLC publishes the Act and its amending laws, the latest being Republic Act No. 11521 of 2021. The Act and the IRR use “shall” and add what the FATF leaves to countries: threshold reports and day counts.

Red flags in transaction monitoring

The FATF Recommendations contain no list of red flags; the Philippines has a binding one. Rule 2, Section 1 of the IRR lists seven “suspicious circumstances,” and Section 3(b-1) of the Act gives a near-identical list.

Suspicious circumstance (IRR, condensed)What a monitoring team may notice
No legal or trade obligation, purpose, or economic justificationPayments with no clear reason for this customer
Client not properly identifiedGaps or doubts in identification data
Amount not commensurate with the client’s business or financial capacityVolumes far above declared income or business size
Transaction structured to avoid reporting requirementsRepeated amounts kept just below a reporting threshold
Deviation from the client’s profile or past transactionsSudden change in amounts, counterparties, or frequency
Link to money laundering, terrorist financing, or related unlawful activityInformation connecting the funds to an offense
Similar, analogous, or identical to any of the above, including linked accountsOne of the patterns above repeated across related or materially-linked accounts

The first column condenses the IRR; the second is our illustration. A flag starts a review; on its own, it does not prove money laundering. Rule 2, Section 1 defines suspicion as “a person’s state of mind—based on his skills, experience, and/or understanding of the customer profile—which considers that there is a possibility that any of the suspicious circumstances exists.”

Covered transactions and CTRs

A covered transaction is defined by amount and payment form. Under Section 3(b) of the Act, as amended by RA 11521, it is “a transaction in cash or other equivalent monetary instrument involving a total amount in excess of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) within one (1) banking day.” No suspicion is needed: a covered transaction report (CTR) records a cash (generally also equivalent-instrument) amount and says nothing about the customer’s intent.

Three groups of covered persons have their own thresholds:

Covered personCovered transactionProvision
Casinos (Section 3(a)(8))Single casino cash transaction over PHP 5,000,000 or foreign-currency equivalentAct, Section 3(b)
Real estate developers and brokers (Section 3(a)(9))Single cash transaction over PHP 7,500,000 or foreign-currency equivalentAct, Section 3(b)
Jewelry dealers, dealers in precious metals or stones (Section 3(a)(4)–(5))Cash or equivalent instrument transaction over PHP 1,000,000IRR Rule 2, Section 1(w)(2)

Section 9(c) of the Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10365 of 2013, sets the period. Covered persons “shall report to the AMLC all covered transactions and suspicious transactions within five (5) working days from occurrence thereof, unless the AMLC prescribes a different period not exceeding fifteen (15) working days.” IRR Rule 22, Section 2.1 applies that period to CTRs; Section 2.2 sets a shorter one for STRs (below).

Under Rule 22, Section 1.3, lawyers and accountants who are authorized to practice their profession in the Philippines and engaged as independent professionals are not required to file CTRs on information concerning their clients.

Suspicious transactions and STRs

A suspicious transaction is defined by circumstances, at any amount. Rule 2, Section 1 of the IRR defines it as “a transaction, regardless of amount, where any of the suspicious circumstances, as herein defined, is determined, based on suspicion or, if available, reasonable grounds, to be existing.” Under the same section, an unsuccessful attempt to transact, denied because of a suspicious circumstance, “shall likewise be considered as suspicious transaction.” Rule 22, Section 1.1 adds: “STRs shall cover all transactions, whether completed or attempted.”

Rule 22, Section 2.2, in force since 31 January 2020, states: “STRs shall be promptly filed within the next working day from occurrence thereof, which for purposes of this Rule, shall be the date of establishment of suspicion or determination of the suspicious nature of the transaction.”

The AMLC’s reporting guidelines limit how long establishing suspicion can take. Covered persons have up to 10 calendar days to establish whether a transaction shows one of the suspicious circumstances listed in the AMLA, even when their monitoring system flagged it. They have up to 60 calendar days to establish a link to an unlawful activity or to resolve other system alerts, and the STR is then due the next working day. Highly unusual or suspicious transactions, such as those involving a sanctioned person or patently linked to terrorism, get no such period: suspicion is established “promptly on the date of the transaction, activity, or establishment of the suspicious circumstance.” These periods were set in the 2021 AMLC Registration and Reporting Guidelines (ARRG). They are kept in the Guidelines on Transaction Reporting and Compliance Submissions (GoTRACS), AMLC Regulatory Issuance No. 2, Series of 2024, issued in December 2024.

If a transaction is both covered and suspicious, Section 9(c) of the Act requires it to be reported as a suspicious transaction. Under IRR Rule 22, Section 1.2, it is first reported as a CTR and updated if it is finally confirmed as reportable as an STR.

FeatureCTRSTR
TriggerCash (generally also equivalent-instrument) transaction over the thresholdSuspicion that a listed circumstance exists
AmountOver PHP 500,000 in one banking day, or a sector thresholdAny amount
AttemptsNot addressed in the provisions cited hereIncluded, completed or attempted
DeadlineFive working days; the AMLC may set up to 15Next working day after suspicion is established
ProvisionAct, Sections 3(b), 9(c); IRR Rule 22, Section 2.1Act, Section 3(b-1); IRR Rule 2, Section 1; Rule 22, Sections 1.1, 2.2

Under IRR Rule 22, Section 7 (Confidentiality of Reporting), covered persons and their officers and employees are prohibited from disclosing that a covered or suspicious transaction “has been or is about to be reported.” The ban extends to the contents of the report and related information, and Section 9(c) of the Act says the same in similar words.

What monitoring systems the IRR expects

Under Rule 18, Section 8.1, covered persons “shall, on the basis of materiality and risk, conduct ongoing monitoring by establishing a system” for understanding customers’ normal and reasonable activity and scrutinizing transactions. Rule 22, Section 5.1 adds: “All covered persons shall adopt an AML/CTF monitoring system that is appropriate for their risk-profile and business complexity.”

Covered persons “that are considered complex, as determined by SAs,” meaning their supervising authorities, shall adopt an electronic system (Section 5.2.1). At a minimum, it shall detect transactions or accounts that qualify as covered or suspicious. Under Section 5.2.2, that system “must have, at least,” automated functions that include:

  • statistical analysis and profiling to detect unusual patterns of account activity;
  • watchlist checks of transfer parties and the existing customer database;
  • aggregation of a customer’s multiple accounts;
  • recording of suspicious transactions and support for investigating alerts, whether or not a report was filed.

The watchlist function extends the AML screening done at onboarding to the parties of later transfers. Covered persons not required to have an electronic system “shall ensure that they have the means of flagging and monitoring” transactions. They “shall maintain a register of all STs,” meaning suspicious transactions, brought to the attention of senior management “whether or not the same was reported to the AMLC” (Section 5.3).

As in the FATF text, the IRR uses “real-time monitoring where feasible” only for cross-border wire transfers that lack required originator or beneficiary information (Rule 19, Section 6.3.2). It sets no general real-time requirement.

Under Rule 18, Section 8.2, covered persons shall apply EDD when monitoring raises doubt about the accuracy of information or documents provided, or about the ownership of a juridical person or legal arrangement. The same applies when monitoring justifies moving the customer from low or normal to high risk, or indicates a suspicious circumstance.

A worked example. A hypothetical e-money customer onboarded as a student, with small monthly top-ups, starts receiving transfers from many unrelated senders and moving the funds out the same day. The pattern deviates from the client’s profile, so an alert is raised whatever the amounts involved. Because that is a suspicious circumstance listed in the AMLA, the reporting guidelines allow up to 10 calendar days to establish suspicion. If the analyst establishes it on a Tuesday, the STR is due within the next working day, Wednesday unless it is a holiday. The institution applies EDD and records the case without telling the customer about the report.

What is still open. Which covered persons count as complex is for the supervising authorities, such as the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), to determine; their issuances are outside this article. The ARRG and the GoTRACS also word the starting day of the 10- and 60-day counts differently, so teams should read the provision that governs their case.

Sources checked on 4 November 2026.

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or regulatory advice. Organizations should confirm how monitoring and reporting requirements apply to them with the relevant authority or legal counsel.

Conclusion

Transaction monitoring is the ongoing half of customer due diligence: the check that a customer’s activity still matches what onboarding established. The FATF frames this as a duty countries should impose, scaled by risk, and links it to prompt reporting of suspicions and to records of the analysis behind each decision.

The Philippines turns that frame into binding rules with two separate reports. A CTR follows from a cash (generally also equivalent-instrument) amount; an STR follows from a circumstance, at any amount, and under the IRR also for attempts and on a shorter deadline. The IRR then sizes the monitoring system to the covered person, from electronic tools for institutions that supervisors determine to be complex to manual flagging and a register for the rest. For a monitoring team, the practical test is whether every closed or reported alert can be explained from the file.

FAQ

Question author
What is the difference between KYC and transaction monitoring?
KYC commonly refers to the customer identification and onboarding checks: identifying and verifying the customer, identifying the beneficial owner, and understanding the purpose of the relationship. Transaction monitoring is ongoing customer due diligence, described in FATF Recommendation 10(d) as scrutiny of transactions throughout the relationship. Both are part of customer due diligence.
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Question author
Do banks monitor transactions?
Yes, and the legal duty comes from each country's own law. The FATF standard expects countries to require financial institutions to scrutinize customers' transactions throughout the relationship. In the Philippines, under the 2018 IRR, covered persons, banks among them, shall adopt a monitoring system appropriate for their risk profile and business complexity.
NeuroVision expert
Question author
What are the red flags for AML transaction monitoring?
In the Philippines, the IRR lists seven suspicious circumstances. Examples are a transaction with no legal, trade, or economic justification, an amount out of line with the client's financial capacity, structuring to avoid reporting, and deviation from the client's profile. Under the FATF standard, institutions should examine, as far as reasonably possible, complex, unusual large transactions and unusual patterns with no apparent economic or lawful purpose.
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Question author
What is the threshold for a covered transaction in the Philippines?
Under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended, the general threshold is a transaction in cash or other equivalent monetary instrument totaling more than PHP 500,000 within one banking day. Three groups of covered persons have their own thresholds. They are more than PHP 5,000,000 for a single casino cash transaction and more than PHP 7,500,000 for a single cash transaction with real estate developers and brokers. For jewelry dealers and dealers in precious metals or stones, the IRR sets it at a cash or equivalent-instrument transaction over PHP 1,000,000.
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Question author
What is a covered transaction report?
In the Philippines, a covered transaction report (CTR) is a report on a covered transaction that a covered person files with the AMLC. A CTR needs no suspicion and is due within five working days, unless the AMLC prescribes a different period of up to 15 working days. Lawyers and accountants who are authorized to practice their profession in the Philippines and engaged as independent professionals are not required to file CTRs on client information.
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Question author
In how many days should suspicious transaction reports be filed in the Philippines?
Under Rule 22, Section 2.2 of the AMLC's 2018 implementing rules (casinos have separate rules), STRs shall be filed promptly, within the next working day from occurrence. Occurrence is the date suspicion is established or the suspicious nature of the transaction is determined; this period has applied since 31 January 2020. The AMLC's reporting guidelines allow up to 10 calendar days to establish a suspicious circumstance listed in the AMLA. They allow up to 60 calendar days to establish a link to an unlawful activity or to resolve other monitoring-system alerts. Highly unusual or suspicious transactions, such as those involving a sanctioned person, get no such period.
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