What is AML (anti-money laundering)? How it works alongside KYC

What is AML (Anti-Money Laundering)? How AML programs work under FATF standards, AML vs KYC explained, and who regulates AML in Southeast Asia.
Anti-money laundering (AML) is the system of laws and controls that banks and certain other businesses use to prevent, detect, and report money laundering. Each country’s law decides who is covered, following an international standard set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Know Your Customer (KYC), the checks on each customer, is one part of AML. Country examples come from the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia. A rule quoted for one country applies only in that country.
In brief
- Who: banks and other financial institutions, certain non-financial businesses and professions, and virtual asset service providers, as each country’s law names them.
- What: seven program components, as grouped in this article: risk assessment, customer due diligence, screening, ongoing monitoring, suspicious transaction reporting, record-keeping, and internal controls with training and audit.
- Where KYC fits: KYC is the customer due diligence component, applied at onboarding and throughout the relationship.
What is AML?
Legally, AML is a set of obligations: laws and regulations require financial institutions and certain other businesses to run internal controls that prevent, detect, and report money laundering. In the words of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Money laundering is the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin.” The same overview says the process typically follows three stages. Placement is “moving the funds from direct association with the crime,” and layering is “disguising the trail to foil pursuit.” Integration is “making the money available to the criminal from what seem to be legitimate sources.” Each country defines the criminal offense in its own law, and the wording can differ. UNODC explains why the process matters to criminals: laundering “enables the criminal to enjoy these profits without jeopardizing their source.”
AML works in three layers. The first is the FATF Recommendations, as amended in June 2026, an international standard that countries should implement “through measures adapted to their particular circumstances.”
The second layer is national law. The Recommendations are addressed to countries: countries “should require” institutions to act, and institutions “should be required” to do so. The obligation that binds an institution comes from its country’s AML law and regulator rules. The third layer is the institution’s AML program, which applies that law to customers and transactions.
Because the same programs also address terrorist financing, laws and regulators often use the wider term anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). FATF Recommendation 1 adds a third risk, proliferation financing, to the risks that countries should require institutions to assess and mitigate. In Recommendation 1 and its interpretive note, proliferation financing risk “refers strictly and only to the potential breach, non-implementation or evasion of the targeted financial sanctions obligations referred to in Recommendation 7.”
Who has to comply with AML rules?
The FATF Standards (the Recommendations, their interpretive notes, and the Glossary) describe three groups that countries should bring into scope:
- Financial institutions. The FATF Glossary covers any business that conducts certain activities for or on behalf of a customer. Examples are accepting deposits, lending, money or value transfer services, issuing and managing means of payment such as electronic money, and trading in securities.
- Designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs). These are casinos, including internet casinos; real estate agents; dealers in precious metals and stones; “lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants”; and trust and company service providers. They are covered in certain situations.
- Virtual asset service providers (VASPs). Under Recommendation 15, countries should ensure that VASPs are regulated for AML/CFT purposes and licensed or registered.
National laws use their own names for these businesses. They are “covered persons” in the Philippines and “reporting institutions” in Malaysia. National lists differ.
How an AML compliance program works: 7 core components
An AML compliance program is the set of controls an institution runs to meet its country’s AML law. This article groups the relevant FATF Recommendations into seven components; the interpretive note to Recommendation 18 itself names three program elements, covered in the last one. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), for example, says the controls it requires of financial institutions include identifying and knowing their customers, including beneficial owners, conducting regular account reviews, and monitoring and reporting suspicious transactions.
Risk assessment
Under Recommendation 1 and its interpretive note, financial institutions and DNFBPs should be required to identify and assess their money laundering and terrorist financing risks. The assessment covers customers, countries or geographic areas, products, services, transactions, and delivery channels. They should document it and keep it up to date. Competent authorities or self-regulatory bodies may determine that individual documented risk assessments are not required if the specific risks inherent to the sector are clearly identified and understood. They should also be required to have policies, controls, and procedures, approved by senior management, to manage and mitigate the risks identified.
Where risks are higher, institutions should be required to take enhanced measures; where risks are lower, they should be allowed and encouraged to take simplified measures. This is the risk-based approach.
Customer due diligence (KYC)
Under Recommendation 10, institutions should be required to apply customer due diligence (CDD) when establishing a business relationship and when carrying out certain occasional transactions. The same duty applies when there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, or when the institution doubts identification data obtained earlier. The CDD measures are:
- identifying the customer and verifying their identity using reliable, independent source documents, data, or information;
- identifying the beneficial owner and taking reasonable measures to verify their identity;
- understanding the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship;
- conducting ongoing due diligence on the relationship, including scrutiny of its transactions.
Institutions should set the extent of these measures using the risk-based approach and should also apply them to existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk. Recommendation 10 also says that financial institutions should be prohibited from keeping anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names. In practice, CDD is repeated during the relationship, as well as at onboarding.
The interpretive note to Recommendation 10 lists examples of enhanced due diligence (EDD). They include more information on the customer and the intended relationship, information on the source of funds or wealth, senior management approval, and enhanced monitoring. The note’s examples of simplified measures include updating identification data less often and inferring the purpose of the relationship from its type. Simplified measures are not acceptable whenever there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, or where specific higher-risk scenarios apply.
In the Philippines, Circular No. 1170, Series of 2023 (Monetary Board Resolution No. 402, 23 March 2023), of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) allows covered persons to use electronic KYC (eKYC). It calls the national ID system, PhilSys, “a reliable and independent source of verifying the customer’s identity.” In Malaysia, the e-KYC policy document of Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) was issued and took effect on 15 April 2024. Where a technology provider supplies the eKYC solution, the institution is required to ensure that its modules have been “assessed by a credible external independent assessor” (paragraph 8.22). BNM also allows eKYC conducted solely by a human representative, such as by video call (paragraph 8.26), and then requires internal safeguards against the higher risk of misidentification (paragraph 8.28).
Screening against sanctions and PEP lists
Checking customers against sanctions lists and lists of politically exposed persons (PEPs) is usually called AML screening. Under FATF Recommendations 6 and 7 and their interpretive notes, countries should require all natural and legal persons to freeze designated persons’ assets “without delay and without prior notice.” Designations come from or under the authority of the UN Security Council and, for Recommendation 6, also nationally under resolution 1373. The interpretive note to Recommendation 1 describes the Recommendation 7 obligations as not risk-based. In practice, institutions screen customers against sanctions lists to meet the national rules that implement them.
Recommendation 12 covers PEPs. For foreign PEPs, it says institutions should be required to:
- have risk-management systems to determine whether a customer or its beneficial owner is a foreign PEP;
- obtain senior management approval for the relationship;
- take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds;
- conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring.
For domestic PEPs and PEPs of international organizations, institutions should be required to take reasonable measures to determine whether a customer or its beneficial owner is such a PEP. In higher-risk cases, they should be required to apply the other measures too. These requirements should also apply to family members and close associates of PEPs.
Ongoing monitoring of transactions
Ongoing due diligence is the fourth CDD measure. Recommendation 10 says it is “to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile,” including the source of funds where necessary.
The industry calls this transaction monitoring. In practice, systems raise alerts on activity that does not fit the customer profile. An analyst reviews the customer file, the transaction history, and the counterparties involved. The alert is then closed with a recorded reason or escalated, and where suspicion remains, the reporting duty under Recommendation 20 applies. Examples from the rules of the Philippines’ Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) and BNM’s policy document include:
- no underlying legal, trade, or economic purpose (AMLC);
- amounts out of line with the customer’s capacity (AMLC);
- activity departing from the customer’s profile or history (AMLC);
- an account moving funds with no obvious purpose (BNM).
Suspicious transaction reporting
Recommendation 20 sets the reporting duty. It applies when a financial institution suspects, or has reasonable grounds to suspect, that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity or are related to terrorist financing. The institution should then be required by law to report its suspicions promptly to the financial intelligence unit (FIU), in a suspicious transaction report (STR). Recommendation 23 extends the duty to DNFBPs with qualifications: “lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants,” for example, should be required to report when carrying out certain client transactions. Under its interpretive note, they are not required to report information obtained under professional secrecy or legal professional privilege. For accountants, this applies when they act as independent legal professionals.
The interpretive note to Recommendation 20 adds that all suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, should be reported regardless of the amount. It also says the reporting requirement should be “a direct mandatory obligation.” The Philippines applies this through Rule 22 of the 2018 implementing rules of its Anti-Money Laundering Act. Covered persons are required to file STRs with the AMLC, and STRs “shall cover all transactions, whether completed or attempted.”
Under Recommendation 21, institutions, their directors, officers, and employees should be protected by law when they report suspicions in good faith to the FIU. The protection covers criminal and civil liability for breaching restrictions on disclosing information. They should also be prohibited by law “from disclosing (‘tipping-off’) the fact that a suspicious transaction report (STR) or related information is being filed with the FIU.” Under Recommendation 29, the FIU receives and analyzes STRs and disseminates the results.
Record-keeping
Under Recommendation 11, financial institutions should be required to keep all necessary records on domestic and international transactions for at least five years. The same minimum applies to CDD records, account files, and business correspondence, counted from the end of the business relationship or from the date of an occasional transaction.
Transaction records “must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions.” CDD information and transaction records should be available to the competent authorities in their country upon appropriate authority.
Internal controls, training, and independent audit
Recommendation 18 says financial institutions should be required to implement “programmes against money laundering and terrorist financing,” and financial groups should be required to implement group-wide programs. Its interpretive note says these programs should include:
- internal policies, procedures, and controls, including compliance management arrangements and adequate screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees;
- an ongoing employee training program;
- an independent audit function to test the system.
Compliance management arrangements should include the appointment of a compliance officer at the management level. The type and extent of the measures should be appropriate to the money laundering and terrorist financing risk and to the size of the business.
Checking an AML program against the FATF baseline
R. stands for Recommendation and INR. for its interpretive note; national law sets the exact duty.
- Risk assessment (R.1, INR.1): Is the assessment current and documented, with approved policies? Evidence: the dated assessment and its sign-off, unless the supervisor has waived it. Gap: an assessment older than the current products.
- Customer due diligence (R.10): Does each customer file cover all four CDD measures? Evidence: a sample of customer files. Gap: a company file with no beneficial owner identified.
- Screening (R.6, R.7, R.12): Are customers and beneficial owners screened? Evidence: screening logs and PEP approvals. Gap: beneficial owners never screened.
- Ongoing monitoring (R.10): Does ongoing due diligence include scrutiny of transactions against the customer’s profile? Evidence: in practice, the alert log with decisions. Gap: transactions never compared with the customer’s profile.
- Reporting (R.20, INR.20, R.21; R.23 for DNFBPs): Do staff report suspicions, including attempted transactions, without tipping off? Evidence: the STR register and training records. Gap: attempted transactions never reported.
- Record-keeping (R.11): Can a sampled transaction be reconstructed from the records? Evidence: a reconstruction test. Gap: CDD records deleted within five years of exit.
- Internal controls (R.18, INR.18): Are the compliance officer, training, and independent audit in place? Evidence: the appointment, training log, and latest audit report. Gap: no independent test of the program.
AML vs KYC: how they fit together
The checklist reviews the program as a whole; KYC is where that program meets each customer. KYC is the industry name for the identification and due diligence part of AML, which the FATF Standards call customer due diligence. KYC verification establishes who the customer is and what the relationship is for, through the four CDD measures set out in the CDD section.
| Aspect | KYC (customer due diligence) | AML (the whole program) |
|---|---|---|
| What it is | Knowing each customer | Laws, rules, and internal controls |
| Scope | One customer relationship | The whole institution |
| FATF basis | R.10; R.12 for PEPs | R.1, R.10–12, R.18, R.20, and others |
| When | Onboarding and throughout the relationship | Continuously |
| Output | Risk profile; onboard, decline, or exit | Assessments, alerts, STRs, records, audits |
Recommendation 10 is where the two meet. If an institution cannot complete CDD, it should be required not to open the account, start the relationship, or perform the transaction, or to end an existing relationship. It should also consider filing an STR.
For illustration only: three customers of one institution
| Customer | Assessed risk | Measures under FATF |
|---|---|---|
| Retail e-wallet user | Low | Where national rules allow, simplified measures, e.g., less frequent identification updates (INR.10) |
| Company whose beneficial owner is a foreign PEP | Higher | R.12: senior management approval, source of wealth and funds, enhanced monitoring |
| Company whose beneficial owner cannot be identified | Cannot be assessed (CDD incomplete) | The R.10 rule on incomplete CDD |
This is not a universal rule: national law sets the measures for each type of customer.
Reference: AML authorities and laws in Southeast Asia
For six Southeast Asian countries, this section names the main AML authority, the financial intelligence unit, and the main AML law. It records roles and legal titles only; obligations are set in each country’s law and regulator rules. The FIU sits in different kinds of bodies across these countries, so the authority that receives an STR depends on where the institution operates.
Philippines
- Authority: Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the Philippines’ financial intelligence unit, chaired by the BSP Governor.
- Supervision: Under the 2018 implementing rules, the AMLC exercises general AML supervision over all covered persons. The BSP is the supervising authority for banks and other BSP-supervised institutions; it issues AML guidelines for them, examines their compliance, and takes enforcement action.
- Main law: Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 (Republic Act No. 9160), as amended, most recently by Republic Act No. 11521 (2021), according to the AMLC’s list of laws.
- Reports received: The AMLC received 4,452,917 suspicious transaction reports in 2022, according to its Annual Report 2019 to 2022, the latest it had published as of 3 November 2026. The same report gives 623,021 for 2019.
Singapore
- Authority: MAS supervises financial institutions for AML/CFT. The FIU is the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office (STRO) of the Singapore Police Force, which receives STRs.
- Main law: Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (CDSA), the main money laundering offense law, alongside the MAS AML/CFT Notices for financial institutions.
- Main rules for financial institutions: MAS Notice 626 for banks, dated 28 March 2024 and last revised on 30 June 2025.
Malaysia
- Authority: Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), the competent authority under the country’s AML law and, under the same Act, the financial intelligence unit.
- Main law: Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 (Act 613), most recently amended by Act A1761, in force since 1 March 2026.
- Main rules for financial institutions: BNM’s policy document Anti-Money Laundering, Countering Financing of Terrorism, Countering Proliferation Financing and Targeted Financial Sanctions for Financial Institutions (BNM/RH/PD 030-14), issued on 5 February 2024.
Indonesia
- Authority: PPATK (Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan, the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center), an independent FIU that reports directly to the President.
- Main law: Law No. 8 of 2010 on the Prevention and Eradication of Money Laundering. Some of its offense provisions are now in the new Criminal Code (Law No. 1 of 2023), in force since 2 January 2026.
- Main rules for financial institutions: Regulation No. 8 of 2023 of the Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK), Indonesia’s financial services authority, in force since 14 June 2023. It covers AML, counter-terrorist-financing, and counter-proliferation-financing programs in the financial services sector.
Vietnam
- Authority: State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), responsible to the Government for state management of AML; it receives suspicious transaction reports.
- Main law: Law on Anti-Money Laundering No. 14/2022/QH15, in force since 1 March 2023; amended by Law No. 23/2026/QH16, which takes effect on 1 December 2026.
- Main rules for financial institutions: Decree No. 19/2023/NĐ-CP, detailing the AML law, and SBV Circular No. 27/2025/TT-NHNN, in force since 1 November 2025.
Coming into force on 1 December 2026. Law No. 23/2026/QH16 is not yet in force as of 3 November 2026. From 1 December 2026, it adds dịch vụ tài sản mã hóa (crypto-asset services) to the activities in Article 4(1) that make a licensed financial institution a reporting entity. It also adds Article 33a on suspicious indicators in the crypto-asset sector (dấu hiệu đáng ngờ trong lĩnh vực tài sản mã hóa). The English glosses are unofficial translations.
Thailand
- Authority: Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), an independent office established under the Act; it receives transaction reports.
- Main law: Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999), as amended, most recently by Amendment No. 6, B.E. 2565 (2022); B.E. stands for Buddhist Era.
- Main rules for financial institutions: the Ministerial Regulation on Customer Due Diligence B.E. 2563 (2020), in force since August 2020, for financial institutions and the businesses listed in Section 16 of the Act.
What is still open
- Malaysia, checked 3 November 2026: BNM’s published text of Act 613 does not yet incorporate Act A1761. BNM’s own legislation page gives A1761’s entry into force as 1 March 2026, so the gap concerns the consolidated text only.
- Philippines, checked 3 November 2026: the AMLC’s latest published annual report covers 2019 to 2022; no report for 2023, 2024, or 2025 was on its site.
- Vietnam: a search of the Official Gazette (Công báo) on 3 November 2026 found no decree amending or replacing Decree No. 19/2023/NĐ-CP. Law No. 23/2026/QH16 takes effect on 1 December 2026.
Checked on 3 November 2026 against official sources, including the FATF Recommendations page. Legal titles for Indonesia and Vietnam are unofficial English translations; the title for Thailand follows the English translation published by AMLO.
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or regulatory advice. Organizations should confirm how AML requirements apply to them with the relevant authority or legal counsel.
The FATF standard gives AML programs in different countries a shared structure, while each country’s own law sets the duties and the businesses they reach. Inside a program, the components depend on each other.
KYC supplies the facts the rest of the program runs on. Monitoring compares transactions against those facts, and reporting acts when they do not fit. An out-of-date risk assessment no longer tells the institution how deep CDD and monitoring should go, and incomplete records weaken the reports built on them. The checklist turns that structure into questions a reviewer can test against evidence.