The 3 Stages of Money Laundering: Placement, Layering, and Integration

What are the 3 stages of money laundering? Placement, layering, and integration explained, with Southeast Asian examples and AML controls for each stage.
Money laundering is typically described in three stages: placement, layering, and integration. Placement moves criminal proceeds away from direct association with the crime, layering disguises the trail, and integration makes the money available again from what seem to be legitimate sources. This is how the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) frames the process, and it comes with a caveat: real cases may combine, skip, or repeat stages.
The model is useful because it gives compliance teams a shared way to ask where funds are in the cycle and which anti-money laundering (AML) and Know Your Customer (KYC) controls can see them there. Southeast Asia is the focus here because the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and UNODC have published recent regional material on scam proceeds, mule networks, casinos, and virtual assets.
Examples come from the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia, where primary case material is available, together with regional findings from UNODC and the FATF. Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand appear in the authority table. Rules and risks differ by country, so no example here should be read as typical of the whole region.
What are the 3 stages of money laundering?
In UNODC’s words, “Money laundering is the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin.” The three stages are placement, layering, and integration. They follow the money’s journey: at placement, funds are closest to the underlying crime; by integration, they are as far from it as the launderer can make them appear.
Examples of each stage of money laundering
Each row pairs a stage with the launderer’s goal, typical channels, and one example described below.
| Stage | The launderer’s goal | Typical channels in the cited sources | Example from this article |
|---|---|---|---|
| Placement | Move proceeds away from the crime and into the financial system | Mule accounts, shell or newly registered companies, and accounts opened with handed-over identities | Singapore: individuals handed their national digital identity to syndicates, which used it to open accounts remotely (Stage 1) |
| Layering | Disguise the trail and put distance between the funds and their source | Pass-through transfers between accounts, junkets, cryptocurrency, and stablecoins | Southeast Asia (countries not named): gambling and fraud proceeds moved through money exchanges across two borders (UNODC, 2022, cited in the 2023 report; Stage 2) |
| Integration | Make the funds available again from what seem to be legitimate sources | Real estate, luxury assets, business ventures, and online casinos and related businesses | Singapore, 2023: the suspects generally used illicit funds to buy properties, gold bars, luxury watches, and jewelry (Inter-Ministerial Committee, 2024; Stage 3) |
Where the model comes from
Three authorities describe the model in their public materials: the FATF’s public FAQ, UNODC’s overview, and the money laundering page of Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM).
The model is a descriptive tool used by the FATF, UNODC, and national authorities. It is not a legal standard, and the FATF Recommendations, the international anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards, do not use it. Legal definitions work differently. The 1988 UN Vienna Convention (Article 3.1), for example, describes money laundering by conduct, such as converting or transferring property known to derive from an offense to conceal or disguise its illicit origin. National definitions differ.
Do the stages always happen in order?
No. UNODC points out that real cases may lack one or more of the stages, combine some of them, or repeat several. In its own example, a mule’s deposits followed by a payment to a shell company make placement and layering effectively one stage.
A 2023 report by the FATF, the Egmont Group, and INTERPOL on illicit financial flows from cyber-enabled fraud found that fraud proceeds are quickly processed into the laundering network. They are then rapidly layered through “pass-through” transactions across domestic or foreign accounts.
A February 2026 FATF paper on cyber-enabled fraud reports that more such schemes build in laundering from the start, using nominee accounts, mule networks, traded bank and exchange accounts, and fast transfers through fintech platforms. For analysts, the practical point is that one payment can be placement, layering, or both at once. The stage label is a way to reason about risk, so there is no need to wait for a clean sequence.
Stage 1: Placement — how proceeds enter the financial system
Placement is the entry point. The FATF’s FAQ describes it as the launderer introducing illegal profits into the financial system, and adds that funds at this stage are usually processed relatively close to the underlying activity. BNM describes it as placing illegal funds into a reporting institution.
Two terms are easy to conflate with laundering itself. A scam is the predicate offense that generates the proceeds. A money mule is a person whose account carries those proceeds.
According to the 2023 report, the laundering networks behind cyber-enabled fraud typically involve money mules and can also include shell companies or legitimate businesses. These networks are spread across banks, payment and remittance firms, and virtual asset service providers (VASPs). Criminals use social media and messaging platforms to recruit mules across borders at scale.
The report also describes general trends in the first account that receives fraud proceeds. For scams such as phishing, impersonation, romance, and employment fraud, that account is an individual mule account. For business email compromise and trading-platform fraud, it is a corporate account, such as a shell or newly registered company. The report cautions that these trends may not apply to all cases. Two cases in the report show what this looks like in the region:
- Philippines. In a case in which the organizer was arrested in 2019, a small store owner was recruited through what looked like a job offer. The store owner then handled 83 cash-based transactions, totaling PHP 3.6 million over six months, for an online romance scam operation.
- Singapore. In a case from Singapore described in the report, analysis by the country’s financial intelligence unit (FIU) found a network of 147 individuals and 276 bank accounts at eight banks. The individuals had handed their national digital identity to syndicates, which used it to open accounts remotely. The FIU detected the network through shared attributes such as transaction patterns, device IDs, and contact details.
Identity-focused controls such as customer identification, identity verification, and duplicate-registration checks address who opens an account, and the Singapore case shows why shared-attribute analysis matters. They also have a built-in limit: a real person with genuine documents can open an account and later lend or sell it, and onboarding checks cannot see that future use.
The signs listed under each stage come from the indicators annex of the 2023 report and, for ownership, from the FATF’s interpretive note to Recommendation 10. The grouping by stage is ours: the report itself arranges its indicators from account opening to transaction monitoring. The report also cautions that a single indicator may not alone warrant suspicion, although it could prompt further monitoring and examination. At placement, the signs concern who opens the account and how it is first used:
- The account holder cannot or will not pass customer due diligence checks.
- Identity details such as an address, phone number, or email are shared, reused, or inconsistent across accounts.
- One device or internet protocol (IP) address is linked to accounts of several different holders.
- Transactions start right after the account is opened and do not fit its stated purpose.
- The customer cannot explain where the funds come from or says they are transacting for someone else.
- Individuals with no financial experience, presented as investors, send payments for investments or financial products to companies, in many cases established in high-risk jurisdictions.
- The receiving company runs a trading or investment website that, in many cases, is not authorized or listed by the local supervisor.
Stage 2: Layering — how the trail is disguised
Layering is about distance. UNODC describes it as disguising the trail to foil pursuit, and BNM as building several layers of transactions that distance the funds from their origin or disguise them. The FATF’s FAQ notes that layering may run through an offshore financial center, a large regional business center, or a world banking center.
Recent UNODC and FATF material points to casinos, junkets, and virtual assets as layering channels. In a 2024 study, UNODC found that casinos, junkets, and cryptocurrency had become a critical part of the infrastructure for underground banking and money laundering across East and Southeast Asia. Online casinos, it found, were used to move and launder both fiat currency and cryptocurrency.
A case in the 2023 report, taken from UNODC’s 2022 threat analysis of Southeast Asia, involves a network running online gambling and cyber-enabled fraud in a special economic zone. Its U.S. dollar proceeds were laundered through money exchanges in a neighboring country, converted into that country’s currency, moved across another border, and paid to the network’s investors. The countries are unnamed, and the layering label is ours.
The FATF’s July 2026 targeted update on virtual assets reports that illicit activity using virtual assets has grown more complex and more interconnected since 2025. Among its examples are scam-center operations linked to organized crime, “pig-butchering” scams, and cross-border money laundering. It also reports that most of the on-chain illicit activity that has been identified now involves stablecoins.
On the detection side, the 2023 report describes Malaysia’s National Scam Response Centre using network analysis to find mule and laundering networks, while financial institutions trace funds from one layer to the next. Transaction monitoring, behavioral analytics, and linked-account analysis suit this stage because they examine flows rather than identity. Their limit is visibility: one institution sees only its own part of the chain.
At layering, the signs concern how the funds move on:
- Large amounts are withdrawn or transferred out almost as soon as they arrive, emptying the account.
- Login and device data do not match the customer: a different time zone, remote desktop access that hides the real device and location, or many devices or IP addresses on one account.
- Transfers go to or from jurisdictions with a high money laundering risk.
- Large virtual-asset transfers involve unhosted wallets or addresses associated with darknet marketplaces, mixing services, gambling sites, or scammers.
- Another institution sends a fraud report or a recall request, or an FIU or law enforcement agency shares adverse information about a party to the transaction.
Stage 3: Integration — how funds come back as legitimate
Integration is the stage in which funds re-enter the legitimate economy, as the FATF’s FAQ puts it. It differs from layering in its goal: layering hides the trail, while integration makes the funds look legitimate, or, in UNODC’s words, “available to the criminal from what seem to be legitimate sources.” The FATF’s FAQ gives investment in real estate, luxury assets, or business ventures as examples. In a 2023 Singapore case, the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Anti-Money Laundering reported in 2024 that the suspects generally used illicit funds “to purchase properties and precious products, such as gold bars, luxury watches and jewellery.” More than S$3 billion in assets were seized or prohibited from disposal, and all ten were convicted of money laundering and other offenses.
UNODC’s 2024 study said that cases it examined showed online casinos and related businesses being used by organized crime groups, “effectively creating channels for integrating billions in criminal proceeds into the financial system”. Goods can also serve as a conversion step. The 2023 report describes fraud proceeds being used to buy goods that are taken across borders and turned back into cash, to be layered and integrated further. The report notes that the commercial businesses involved at this point may fall outside AML/CFT rules and may not know enough to check identity or monitor transactions.
Ongoing due diligence and beneficial owner checks can help surface a mismatch between a customer’s declared business or wealth and what the account shows. They depend on the quality of the information available, and by this point the trail is designed to look legitimate.
At integration, the signs concern whether the money now looks legitimate:
- Activity does not fit the customer’s economic profile, for example large purchases of virtual assets or of goods to be exported.
- Counterparties do not match the customer’s stated business.
- Frequent, large transactions take place with recently established companies, or with companies whose main activities do not match what the beneficiary does or whose stated purpose is general.
- The ownership structure looks unusual or excessively complex for the company’s business, or a legal person serves as a personal asset-holding vehicle.
How AML and KYC controls map to the three stages
Each card below gives a stage’s risk pattern, controls, and limits. The mapping is explanatory and sets no requirements; which controls a firm must apply depends on its jurisdiction and license.
- Risk pattern: Mule or new accounts receive proceeds first, some opened with someone’s handed-over digital identity.
- Controls: Identity, document, and face verification; shared-attribute checks; initial risk assessment; sanctions and politically exposed person (PEP) screening.
- Limit: Misses accounts genuine holders later lend or sell (Stage 1); screening finds listed persons only.
- Risk pattern: Proceeds moved onward quickly through pass-through transactions.
- Controls: Transaction monitoring; behavioral analytics; rapid public-private information sharing (see the Malaysian example above).
- Limit: Real-time payments can shorten the window to act.
- Risk pattern: Movement across accounts, institutions, payment types, jurisdictions, and virtual assets; casinos, junkets, and underground banking (UNODC).
- Controls: Transaction monitoring; linked-account analysis; enhanced due diligence (EDD) for higher-risk customers; suspicious transaction reports (STRs).
- Limit: Cross-border and off-platform legs may be invisible to a single institution.
- Risk pattern: Seemingly legitimate funds via real estate, luxury assets, business ventures, casinos, or goods converted to cash.
- Controls: Ongoing due diligence; beneficial owner, source-of-funds, and source-of-wealth checks; adverse media and PEP screening; EDD.
- Limit: Weak where beneficial ownership information is poor or the trail already looks clean (Stage 3).
At any stage, suspicion is reported to the FIU through an STR; an STR reports suspicion, not proof, and outcomes depend on FIU analysis.
When a sign appears, these steps follow from the sources cited here:
- Weigh the sign against the customer’s profile and any other signs (see Stage 1). Record the reasoning: Recommendation 11 says financial institutions should be required to keep the results of any analysis undertaken.
- Apply enhanced due diligence where risk is higher, such as closer monitoring and more information on the customer and the source of funds or wealth. The FATF’s interpretive note to Recommendation 10 says financial institutions should be required to do this.
- Use network and linked-account analysis to check whether the account is connected to others through shared device IDs, contact details, or transaction patterns, as in the Singapore network in Stage 1.
- If customer due diligence cannot be completed, do not open the account, or end the relationship, and consider filing an STR. Under Recommendation 10, the first two are what financial institutions should be required to do; the STR is one they should consider.
- Act quickly on funds linked to fraud: the 2023 report notes that “intervention is generally most effective within 24 to 72 hours” of a cyber-enabled fraud incident. In its examples, a receiving bank told of a fraudulent transfer holds the funds and alerts law enforcement or the FIU, and FIUs ask each other to suspend proceeds where possible, subject to national law.
The exact obligations behind these steps are set by national law.
KYC verification is one part of an AML framework. FATF Recommendation 10 describes customer due diligence (CDD) as four measures that countries should require financial institutions to apply. They are identifying and verifying the customer using reliable, independent sources; identifying the beneficial owner; understanding the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship; and ongoing due diligence, including source of funds where necessary.
Recommendation 20 adds that financial institutions should be required by law to report suspicions promptly to the FIU. Identity verification helps establish who the customer is; monitoring, AML screening, and reporting address how an account is used, and no single control sees every stage.
How money laundering looks in Southeast Asia
A July 2026 UNODC report describes organized crime in the region as an interconnected, service-based ecosystem. In the words of a UNODC regional representative, the operating model “looks like corporate franchising”, with specialized units for money laundering, human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and data harvesting. UNODC estimated that scam losses across East Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia, and New Zealand reached between USD 88.3 billion and USD 114.1 billion in 2025. That figure measures losses to fraud, the predicate offense, not the amount laundered.
National responses treat the scam, the mule, and the laundering separately. The Philippines made money muling an offense under Republic Act No. 12010, the Anti-Financial Account Scamming Act, signed on 20 July 2024, which counts e-wallets as financial accounts. Singapore toughened penalties for scam mules under the Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2025; its scam-related penalties took effect on 30 December 2025.
Malaysia’s Penal Code (Amendment) Act 2024 (Act A1721), in force since 30 October 2024, added sections 424A–424C, which create these offenses. Each applies to acts done without lawful authority or lawful purpose, except where noted:
- Section 424A: possessing or controlling another person’s account at a financial institution or payment instrument.
- Section 424B: giving someone else possession or control of one’s own account at a financial institution or payment instrument.
- Section 424C: transacting through another person’s account at a financial institution or payment instrument, or through one’s own account at a financial institution or payment instrument without lawful purpose.
Offshore gaming is another channel flagged in the region. Through Executive Order No. 74, signed on 5 November 2024, the Philippines ordered an immediate ban on offshore gaming operations. The order cited a report by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) that found these operators vulnerable to money laundering, fraud, and other illicit finance.
The AMLC’s executive summary of its third national risk assessment, dated November 2025 and covering 2021–2024 for money laundering, rates fraud and scam-related offenses as a high threat. It notes that these schemes exploit e-wallets, mule accounts, and virtual assets, and that “in one major case, assets worth more than ₱4.2 billion were preserved.”
A February 2026 UN human rights report, as summarized by UN News, described the typical laundering path for scam-compound profits. They pass through mule or proxy bank accounts, are turned into cryptocurrency, and move over digital channels before they return to formal banking systems. That path runs through all three stages.
FATF list status, as of the FATF statement of 30 October 2026. Vietnam is on the FATF’s list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring (the “grey list”), where it has been since June 2023, according to the FATF statement of 30 October 2026. In that statement, the FATF “expresses significant concern with the pace of progress and Vietnam’s failure to complete its action plan.” It also says it “will expect to see tangible improvements in February 2027 or the FATF will consider next steps.”
The Philippines exited the list in February 2025 and was not on the list published on 30 October 2026; removal is not a finding that risk is low.
The FATF also says it does not call for enhanced due diligence on listed jurisdictions and encourages a risk-based approach rather than de-risking. It encourages “its members and all jurisdictions” to take the list into account “in their risk analysis”; national requirements may differ.
Reference: key AML authorities in Southeast Asia
This section is a reference for readers working in the region; the stage model above does not depend on it.
| Country | Key AML authority / FIU and role | Primary AML law (as amended) |
|---|---|---|
| Philippines | Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC): the Philippines’ financial intelligence unit and AML/CFT authority | Republic Act No. 9160, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended, most recently by Republic Act No. 11521 (2021) |
| Singapore | Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS): supervises financial institutions on AML/CFT; sets requirements in AML/CFT Notices | Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (CDSA), the key money laundering offense law |
| Singapore | Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office (STRO), Singapore Police Force: the FIU, receiving suspicious transaction reports | As above (CDSA) |
| Malaysia | Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM): competent authority and FIU under Act 613 | Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing, Anti-Restricted Activity Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 (Act 613) |
| Indonesia | PPATK (Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan): Indonesia’s independent financial intelligence unit | Law No. 8 of 2010 on the Prevention and Eradication of the Crime of Money Laundering |
| Vietnam | State Bank of Vietnam (SBV): AML authority; receives suspicious transaction reports | Law on Anti-Money Laundering No. 14/2022/QH15, in force since 1 March 2023; amended by Law No. 23/2026/QH16 |
| Thailand | Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO): independent office; Thailand’s AML authority and FIU; receives transaction reports | Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542 (1999), as amended (unofficial English translation) |
The AMLC is chaired by the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, with the Insurance Commissioner and the Securities and Exchange Commission Chairperson as members. PPATK’s name translates literally as “Center for Financial Transaction Reporting and Analysis” (unofficial translation). AMLO was established under the Anti-Money Laundering Act B.E. 2542; B.E. stands for Buddhist Era.
Amendments to the CDSA under the Anti-Money Laundering and Other Matters Act began to take effect in November 2024. Since 2 January 2026, Articles 2(1), 3, 4, and 5 of Indonesia’s Law No. 8 of 2010 have been replaced by the new Criminal Code (Law No. 1 of 2023). Malaysia’s Act 613 has been amended by Act A1761, and Vietnam’s AML law by Law No. 23/2026/QH16; their dates are in the open points below.
As of 2 November 2026, three points are still open. It is not yet clear how Vietnam’s amended AML law will be applied once Law No. 23/2026/QH16 takes effect on 1 December 2026. The FATF has not said what it will do on Vietnam beyond its statement that it expects tangible improvements in February 2027 (see the FATF note above). BNM’s published text of Act 613 does not yet incorporate Act A1761, which came into force on 1 March 2026.
Checked on 2 November 2026 against official sources and, where no official English text was available, legal databases. Legal titles for Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand are unofficial English translations.
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or regulatory advice.
The placement, layering, and integration model is an analytical tool, separate from legal definitions, and its stages need not follow a fixed sequence. Its value is in asking where funds are in the cycle and what each point makes visible.
UNODC’s overview and the 2023 report show that the stages combine and compress, especially in digital fraud. Layered controls across the customer lifecycle are the practical answer, and each control leaves gaps of its own.
Risks, laws, and supervisory practice differ by country, so organizations should check current requirements with the relevant authority.